Why and how did the PKK disconnect from “the solution process”? How did it drag the HDP along and force it to fall into line? How did Demirtaş go from (i) beginning with targeting the AKP as the principal enemy during the election campaign, through (ii) now supporting and now criticizing the PKK’s resumption of armed conflict over the last four or five months, to (iii) total and unqualified support for the ditches-and-barricades policy since the beginning of December, and finally to (iv) virtually abandoning all thoughts of a “solution within Turkey”?
Silahlı radikal ve ırkçı grupları takip eden SITE Intelligence, El Kaide bağlantılı Eş Şebab’ın ABD’nin Cumhuriyetçi başkan aday adayı Trump’ın konuşmalarını propaganda için kullandığını açıkladı.
Suudi Arabistan’ın, aralarında Suudi vatandaşı Şii din adamı Ayetullah Nemr’in de olduğu 47 kişiyi idam etmesine tepki büyüyor. İran'ın başkenti Tahran'daki Suudi Arabistan Büyükelçiliği önünde toplanan eylemciler, binayı ateşe verdi.
Regardless of how many elections you might have won and what sort of majority you might have achieved in parliament, governing Turkey requires you to be strong in yet another area. You have to be able to break the bureaucracy’s information monopoly and also impose a legislation that will ensure the transparency of following up on all decision-making processes, so that all decisions adopted by the government can be “exactly” implemented, i.e. in conformity with their essence.
If the aim were to create a system of autocratic domination, a presidential system would not be to the AKP’s or Erdoğan’s benefit. No “good” presidential system can provide the government with more power than what they already have. But it would make it easier overall to run the country, reduce all risks, and strengthen legitimacy.