Etyen Mahçupyan
The Turkish original of this article was published as Kürt siyasetinde iç farklılaşma on 18th July 2015.
If, before the elections, we were to ask (a) Demirtaş, (b) Öcalan, and (c) Kandil leader Bayık about just what sort of vote they wanted the HDP to get, and from whom, what would they have said? In the case of Demirtaş, the answer is simple. The HDP leader had based his electoral strategy not on upholding the Solution Process but hostility to the AKP. So he would naturally seek to get as many votes as possible and preferably from left-secularist circles in order to prove that they had truly become an “all-Turkey” party. Hence the outcome is likely to have half-satisfied him. 13 percent was of course to be hugely desired, but that ninety percent of it should have come from the Kurds was a bit disheartening.
For Öcalan, the situation may have been a bit more complicated. It was he who had come up with the policy of “becoming an all-Turkey party,” and of course he too would want to reach out to the left-secularist vote. But at the same time, Öcalan is in prison and given the uncertainties of the international situation he may long continue to be remanded in custody. That is to say, the sphere of action available to the natural leader of the Kurdish movement may remain limited in scope, which would imply that his political influence becomes “extra-systemic” at least to some extent. In contrast, Kandil and the HDP are “intra-systemic” players, and it would not be surprising if Öcalan did not want them to grow too strong. Putting all this together, there can be no doubt that Öcalan, too, must be positive about the HDP beating the electoral threshold. Increasing legitimacy for the civilian movement has to enhance the relative importance of the leader. But at the same time, 13 percent may have been “a bit too much,” for it might result in Demirtaş growing far too important and therefore to the Western world wanting to manipulate and to benefit from this. Moreover, the heavily Kurdish nature of the HDP vote, indicating that the “all-Turkey” project is not finding that many takers, may have been sad also for Öcalan.
As for Bayık, he too would have wanted the HDP to beat the electoral threshold in order to enter the National Assembly in the name of the PKK, but at the same time he might have had inner thoughts about the “discomfort” to result from an outcome that would put Demirtaş too much in the limelight. For [the PKK headquarters on] Mount Kandil, the civilian wing of the movement is meaningful and functional only insofar as it remains an extension of the military body. Otherwise they might lose control, and the balance between and the overall unity and harmony of the diverse constituents of the movement might be damaged. On the other hand, there is also the possibility that the “all-Turkey” policy might result in diluting the struggle and rendering it vulnerable to external influences. Hence for Bayık, it might have been preferable to have the HDP continue as the Kurds’ party. Thus at the end of the day, the HDP relying on the Kurdish vote to beat the electoral threshold on has been good for Kandil, though 13 percent is likely to have worried them, too, perhaps just a bit.
In conclusion, apart from or beyond just beating the [10 percent] threshold, there were two parameters for the Kurdish movement in these elections: just how much they would beat the bar by, and from what social groups these votes would come. On that basis, for Demirtaş there was one good and one bad, while for Bayık there was one bad and one good outcome. In contrast, there were two minuses for Öcalan. This, indeed, is why we are now witnessing three different strategies. In pursuit of an “all-Turkey” outlook, (a) Demirtaş has stated both that they are not “particularly” hostile to the president, and also that they will not betray the secularist votes “transferred” to their care. However (b) this has elicited an immediate intervention from Kandil; they for their part have emphasized both that there can be no cooperation with the AKP, and that there has been no such thing as a [secularist] “transfer” vote, these being Kurdish votes pure and simple. Meanwhile (c) Öcalan has remained silent, but Karayılan, who is known to be close to him, has come out to say both that it would be correct to try to join a possible coalition, and that the HDP is not indebted in any way to the secularists.
In other words, normalization is lapping at the Kurdish political movement, too, from all sides. From now on, we are going to see them, too, display different outlooks, interests or strategies. We can set a homework for ourselves: Naturally the Kurdish movement is against IS. But are all three players in total harmony over this question? Or could it be that there, too, different interests are at work?