Oral Çalışlar
The Turkish original of this article was published as 12 soruda erken seçim ihtimali on 17th July 2015.
Davutoğlu has completed his first round of coalition negotiations. The outcome may be summed up in the following twelve points.
Here is a summary of the first round of negotiations undertaken by Ahmet davutoğlu in hic capacity as Chairman of the AKP.
1. As of the end of the first round, there has emerged an agreement about tackling the possibility of a coalition between the AKP and the CHP. As for the MHP and the HDP, they seem to have preferred to pull aside a bit by recommending an AKP-CHP coalition.
2. Comparing the present outlook with that prevailing before the onset of formal negotiations, the possibility of forming a coalition government may be said to have increased somewhat.
3. At the same time, if we are to ask whether we can now delete the possibility of early elections, or of an early elections government, we would have to say no; this is still a strong possibility confronting us.
4. One wing of the AKP has been pessimistic all along. Their perception is that “the CHP is not going to approach this positively but intends to procrastinate.” They see an early election as more probable. And that is also what they really want.
5. This “pro-early elections” outlook within the AKP also has its CHP counterpart. The insistence that “they must be brought to account [at court]” is bound to nullify all hopes of a coalition impossible.
6. While those that are known to be “close to the president” have been in favor of early elections from the outset, among those that are regarded as close to Davutoğlu the idea that “the possibility of an AKP-CHP coalition must be explored” is growing stronger.
7. All in all, it is from within the AKP that the desire for early elections is sprouting. But for the other parties, too, one can speak of an accumulation to that end. The MHP and the HDP (and to seme extent even the CHP) have not really done everything they could to block the way to an early election, although they did have the tactical ways and means for it.
8. During the election campaign, a primary target of all these three parties was President Tayyip Erdoğan. And among their rank and file, this anti-Erdoğan reaction still runs strong. If, in the course of coalition talks, priority were to be attached to this Erdoğan question as against an objective of “creating a joint government to tackle the questions faced by the country,” there is no way ther AKP can go along with this. Such insistence can effectively eliminate all possibility of a coalition.
9. During the first round of talks, by refraining from any such insistence the CHP caused some hope to emerge for the second round. I have the feeling that the position adopted by Kılıçdaroğlu and his team has come to be qualified as “constructive” by the public. For his part, Davutoğlu, too, by disregarding all the talk around him about “early elections being the best” in order to press ahead to explore various coalition alternatives, appears to have gained in positive ratings by the electorate.
10. Could the second round actually result in a coalition? Admittedly, real-life exigencies are all pointing in the direction of an AKP-CHP coalition. While this was initially a possibility that elicited nothing more than condescending smiles, it is growing stronger and coming to be embraced by broader circles.
11. But so, if we ultimately come to the point of which is the stronger possibility? Early elections or an AKP-CHP coalition?… While the coalition option is on the rise, early elections also remains a strong possibility. Inside and around the CHP, there are strong forces that are unreconciled to coming together with the AKP. Correspondingly, within the AKP, too, “pro-early elections” people still carry considerable weight. There are those who insist that “the AKP rank-and-file cannot possibly digest a coalition with the CHP” and those that define the CHP as “the very antithesis of the AKP.” While we might regard such views as extreme, they do happen to be rather widespread within the AKP.
12. We are going through a process where every single day is important in itself. We happen to be at an interesting, difficult, yet open to development kind of junction. Barring extraordinary developments, I personally am in favor of remaining optimistic. Who knows; maybe this feast and holiday may contribute to mellowing some rigid outlooks and enhancing a tendency for conciliation and compromise, so that Turkey may end up achieving a grand coalition.
With my best wishes for a felicitous Feast of Ramadan.