Etyen Mahçupyan
The Turkish original of this article was published as Koalisyon niçin yapılamadı? on 2nd September 2015.
The inability to forge a coalition has led to holding new elections, and now this is bound to be on the agenda as propaganda material for those impending elections. After the June elections, there was common agreement that whichever party refrained from forming a government would be losing votes in the next round. Rather long talks between the AKP and the CHP having proved fruitless, now some commentators are arguing that one or the other of these two parties is or should be held responsible. But actually, it was the MHP that was by far the “bravest” warrior in the political arena. Despite all the predictions about how not lending support to efforts to form a government would lead to losing votes, not only did the MHP refuse to participate in any coalition, but it also declared right from the outset that it was not going to support any minority or even temporary election government. Subsequently Bahçeli invited the AKP and CHP to cooperate with each other, and without doing anything himself kept telling them what to do. He thus eliminated all alternatives but one, and also calculated that if that did not come to pass he might be able to blame both his rivals at once.
There is, however, a fairly simple story line to these forty-five days. The election outcome had positioned the MHP as the key party, and it did everything within its power to create a deadlock and paralyze the system. Its objective was clear: With no Kurdish solution in sight, and peace receding into the distance, to emerge as the sole representative of “Turkish” identity and the state’s concerns against all other political parties. Hence the MHP calculated and acted on the assumption that all crises would play into its hands. Field surveys reveal this strategy not to be that much of an illusion. If the de facto truce had prevailed, the MHP would have been more likely to lose votes, since then obstructing the formation of a government would have loomed larger. But with the termination of the truce, the MHP’s own contribution to a government crisis has become secondary. To put it in another way, it is the PKK’s own strategic decision that is today strengthening the MHP and enabling it to take votes away from both the AKP and the CHP. And the growth in MHP strength virtually eliminates the HDP’s prospects of joining the government after the next elections. In short, it can be said that through its own counter-policy, the PKK has put paid to the HDP’s hopes for success. It is worth noting, indeed, the death of all talk of the HDP evolving into an “all-Turkey” identity.
On the other hand, none of this says anything about why the AKP and the CHP could not agree on a coalition. For these two parties could well have found a common ground. But what happened was that the CHP, holding the weaker hand, actually behaved as if it were in an advantageous position. As field surveys were showing the AKP to have moved a few points higher [above its 7th June vote], it was clear that that party would prefer new elections to a coalition. But it was also equally clear that the prime minister sincerely wanted a coalition. So if the CHP had not been after a “restoration,” that is to say if it had not come to the negotiating table with a desire to “rectify” all that the AKP had done to this day, the AKP would not have been in a position to say no to a coalition. More specifically, if the CHP had said yes in principle to the prime minister’s proposal for a one-year reform government, and then had bargained to have this extended to two years, it would have been possible to form a government. But the CHP demanded a four-year collaboration — and from an interlocutor with a vote 16 points higher than its own, which moreover was likely to rise even further in the next round.
At the end of the day, if today we are heading for new elections, it is the MHP that bears the strategic and the CHP that bears the tactical blame for this outcome. It is, of course, possible to criticize the AKP in principle. It can be said that given the overall situation in Turkey it should have under all circumstances opted for a coalition. But at the same time, nothing can be more natural than for the first party in the country, and that by quite a few lengths, not to be forced into a coalition. What was required to form a coalition was political vision and acumen, but while the MHP was trying to narrow the field, the CHP for its part turned out to be not of that caliber.