More than a month has passed since PM Davutoğlu’s resignation and the brouhaha over it. The Turkish political seas have calmed, domestic affairs (outside the ongoing struggle with the PKK) have resumed normal daily operations, and celebrity gossip stories are once again taking over the news sites. The Turkish national football team’s poor performance at the Euro 2016 tournament is a dominant theme.
Like sharks sensing blood in the water, the domestic and international Haters’ Press had descended gleefully on PM Davutoğlu’s impending May resignation (1).
But then a funny thing happened: PM Davutoğlu came out to the press, gave a calm, though emotional, presentation to his audience, and even smiled (2). He informed all that the AK Party would go to a general congress in order to choose a new leader, and he would not put his hat in the ring because he felt that he didn’t have enough internal party support. He also stated that he would remain in politics.
Crisis over.
Over the following hours, the Turkish press would report that President Erdoğan had told party members that the decision to go to a general party congress was entirely Davutoğlu’s decision, and that, again, this was because Davutoğlu felt that he didn’t have sufficient party backing for his policy decisions (3).
The sense of disappointment amongst the opposition was palpable. Many spent the day shrilly screaming “palace coup!” on social media because they weren’t able to come up with a more profound (or mature) political analysis. Those same people are the ones who spent:
— June 2013 begging the Turkish military to “take matters in hand”;
— December 2013-March 2014 rooting for Fethullah Gülen’s cult cronies in Turkish state institutions;
— the summer of 2014 talking up Selahattin Demirtaş as well as Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu’s presidential credentials, and eagerly anticipating disintegration in the AK Party’s internal cohesion à la Turgut Özal’s Motherland Party (ANAP);
— the fall of 2014 purposefully downplaying what the Turkish government did to help Kobané;
— and then summer and fall of 2015 apologizing for the PKK and PYD.
The same commentators have also been engaged in insulting PM Davutoğlu over the past decade by questioning his academic qualifications, his theories on international relations, his credentials as former FM, and his ability to formulate and carry out foreign policies. They were, and are, entirely insincere, and were looking only for another angle to attack the AK Party and President Erdoğan. PM Davutoğlu, displaying a level of grace and aplomb that one hopes will become fashionable in Turkish politics, gave the Haters’ Press nothing to work with.
So the sum once again is that Turkish politics are slowly becoming more like the politics of other European democracies. If the party leader loses the support of his party members, he resigns and a new leader is chosen. That’s the essence of party politics.
An interesting by-product of Davutoğlu’s resignation is that a more nuanced critical voice seems to be emerging from within the conservative political community surrounding the AKP. It is too early to know where this trend will go, but the characteristics are important because the trend comes from within the same political force, and does not engage in the militant, maximalist rhetoric that has always dominated Turkish politics. Instead, these voices appear more calm, measured, and intellectually serious.
More importantly, this may signal a further normalization of Turkish politics. The AKP is by far the largest and most important force in Turkish political life. But the very nature of the AKP’s size, and the total lack of alternatives for Turkish citizens who have serious, thoughtful criticisms to voice, have long created a space in Turkish political life waiting to be filled by a new political organization, most likely of a centrist outlook. On numerous occasions over the years, prominent AKP figures, including Tayyip Erdoğan, have complained about the lack of a serious domestic political opposition. I suspect it would be ironic and fateful if that opposition were to emerge from within the same community.
The HDP has self-destructed, and the MHP looks to be doing the same. A split in the MHP organization will probably result in half the party merging with the AKP and the other half slowly sinking into political irrelevance, much the same way that the Saadet Party (Party of Felicity) has. The CHP still remains a segment of Turkish middle- and upper-class society, marked by all the associated attitudes — much more of a social club than a serious political party.
So now that the steamy Turkish summer has begun, the lack of uproar in Turkish politics seems almost boring. Spending a summer with no scandals other than which Turkish media star — say Kıvanç Tatlıtuğ or the latest person eliminated from “Survivor” — was caught smooching his partner in Çeşme will actually be something of a relief. The dominant political events will apparently be the opening of the İzmit Bay bridge (Osman Gazi Köprüsü) in a few days, and the third Bosphorus bridge (Sultan Selim Köprüsü) in August.
As for former PM Davutoğlu, he recently gave his first interview since his resignation (4). Davutoğlu expressed no regrets, and was extremely humble and realistic about the nature of politics. He continues to be active in the AKP and has even published a new book.
Thus the sharks were sent swimming away with nothing but their own schadenfreude to gnaw on.
NOTES
(1) http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/06/world/europe/ahmet-davutoglu-turkey-prime-minister.html; http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/06/world/europe/ahmet-davutoglu-turkey-prime-minister.html; http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/06/opinion/whatever-happened-to-the-turkish-model.html
(2) http://www.ajanshaber.com/basbakan-davutoglu-istifa-mi-ediyor-haberi/352855
(3) http://www.cnnturk.com/turkiye/cumhurbaskani-erdogan-uzamasi-sikinti-yaratirdi
(4) http://www.haberturk.com/gundem/haber/1255817-ahmet-davutoglu-irademi-kullanmanin-mutlulugu-var